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ABSTRACT
Korea faces a numberof uniqueproblemsthataffect itsexchangeratepolicy. Among these
areitsasymmetriccompetitivepositionvis-~-visJapan,which isboth itsmajor supplierof machine
tools andaleadingcompetitorinthirdmarkets;thecurrentpolicy of financialliberalizationthatgoes
along withdemocratic liberalization;andtheimplications of thepotentialfutureunification of the
Koreanpeninsula. This paperconsidersthe questionof exchange ratepolicy for Korea in the face
of fluctuationsin theyen/dollar rate,increasingcompetition from lower cost Asian countries, and
financial liberalization, The paper deals with external vs. internaltargets, choice of external
comparisonbasket,andtheeffects of financialliberalization.The Koreanchoice of anindependent
exchange ratepolicy is analyzed in termsof the trade-off between externalshocks and inflation-
fighting credibility of the centralbank. Financial liberalizationbrings with it increased capital






Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3305Issues in Korean Exchange Rate Policy
by Stanley W. Black
Department of Economics
University of North Carolina
I. Introduction
As a medium-sized, rapidly industrializing country
approaching membership in the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, Korea faces a number of unique
problems that affect its exchange rate policy. Among these are
its asymmetric competitive position vis-a-vis Japan, which is
both its major supplier of machine tools and a leading competitor
in third markets; the current policy of financial liberalization
that goes along with democratic liberalization; and the
implications of the potential future unification of the Korean
peninsula. The role of Japan as supplier and competitor makes the
widely fluctuating yen/dollar exchange rate a key determinant of
Korean competitiveness and terms of trade. Financial
liberalization is introducing capital flows as a major factor in
exchange rate determination. And the impact of German unification
on the European Monetary System has raised many questions about
the potential future effects of Korean unification. This paper
will seek to explore these issues.
This paper was presented at the NBER East Asian Seminar on
Economics in Hong Kong, June 19-22, 1996. This work is part of
the NBER’s project on International Capital Flows which receives
support from the Center for International Political Economy. An
earlier version was presented at the KDI Symposium on Prospects
of Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate and Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy,
Seoul, December 12, 1995. Revised 8/26/96.
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In the late 1980s, Korean exchange rate policy faced a
situation called the “three blessings” or “three lows” of the low
yen/dollar rate, low oil prices and low world interest rates. The
first of these gave Korea an export stimulus, the second reduced
the cost of energy imports, while the third lowered the cost of
servicing external debt. The major issue at the time was how to
avoid this windfall causing an unsustainable inflationary boom




controversial move, the Korean government
repay much of its external debt, based on
adopted a
the
assumption that the “three lows” were a temporary windfall.
Balassa and Williamson [1987] argued at the time that




response, since it would
Cho [1995] has supported
indicating a much higher
debt had not been repaid.
Korea must live a charmed life,
permit additional domestic
this position with
investment path if external
since recently the world
environment again wore some of the same beneficial aspects,
including a low yen/dollar rate, low oil prices, and low interest
rates. On the other hand, the low yen/dollar rate was one of a
number of factors depressing the Japanese economy, an important
market for Korea. Since mid-1995 however, the yen/dollar rate has
risen significantly, removing some of the export stimulus. And
oil prices have also risen from their lows of late 1995, while3
long term interest rates have rebounded from their lows of early
1996. And differently from 1988, competition from China and other
Asian competitor nations is beginning to raise concerns for
Korean policy-makers. Financial market liberalization is a new
factor affecting both the value of the won and the Korean balance
of payments.
This paper will consider the question of the appropriate
exchange rate policy for Korea in the face of fluctuations in the
yen/dollar rate, increasing competition from lower cost Asian
countries, and financial liberalization. Section II discusses the
main exchange rate policy issues for Korea, dealing with external
Vs . internal targets, choice of external comparison basket, and
the effects of financial liberalization. Section III considers
the issue of regional currency areas. Section IV discusses Korean
unification, and Section V concludes with long run equilibrium.
II. Fundamentals of Exchange Rate Policy
A. Internal vs. External Objectives
The exchange rate defines the external purchasing power of a
nation’s currency. It is essential that this external purchasing
power be consistent in the long run with the currency’s internal
purchasing power. Maintenance of the purchasing power of the
nation’s currency is the fundamental responsibility of the
central bank or monetary authority. As is well known, there are
two approaches to this fundamental problem.4
The internal target approach consists in the central bank
defining and maintaining a rate of growth of the money supply
that is consistent with price stability, defined as a low and
stable rate of inflation. The exchange rate is not in this case a
target for monetary policy, but simply an instrument that is
controlled to ensure the consistency between the internal and
external purchasing power of the currency. This ensures the
competitiveness of domestic exporters in international markets.
The external target approach involves setting a fixed
exchange rate with a relatively stable currency, usually that of
a large trading partner, and using the external price level to
anchor domestic prices. In this case monetary policymakers must
act to keep domestic interest rates aligned with foreign rates
and orient all policy instruments to maintaining the exchange
rate. In case domestic inflationary factors cause the exchange
rate to become overvalued, devaluation to restore competitiveness
is required.
The choice between these two methods of monetary control and
exchange rate policy depends on the relative importance of
flexibility in the exchange rate and credibility gained by
anchoring the domestic price level to world prices through a
fixed exchange rate. This problem has been formalized by
Deverajan and Rodrik [1991] in the context of a Barre-Gordon
model [1983] of an open economy subject to terms of trade shocks.
The central bank’s credibility is in question because it has an
output target that exceeds the level consistent with stable5
prices. Price and wage setters must choose their behavior before
knowing the terms of trade shock or the current exchange rate.
The central bank has two choices. It may commit itself to a fixed
exchange rate, which prevents it from offsetting the terms of
trade shock and from inflating to exploit the prior setting of
wages and prices so as to achieve a lower unemployment rate. Or
it may adopt a flexible rate to offset terms of trade shocks,
which then allows it to indulge in inflationary behavior as well.
If the central bank has relatively strong anti-inflation
credibility, then it will not be tempted to inflate when given
the option by flexibility. In this case, the flexible rate option
will allow use of the exchange rate to offset terms of trade
shocks without paying a cost in terms of higher inflation.
However, if the central bank’s credibility is low, this option is
best foregone, in order to avoid the inflationary consequences.
What is the empirical evidence on the choice between pegged
and flexible rates? Edwards [1993] has shown that countries with
previous experience of low inflation may be able to use a fixed
exchange rate to keep their inflation low. But those with high
inflation may not be able to gain credibility simply by fixing
the exchange rate.
Edwards [1996, this volume] argues that political
instability shortens the time horizon of the authorities and
reduces their willingness to undertake necessary devaluations.
The second factor makes a peg less attractive, while the first
has ambiguous effects. His regressions incorporate political6
instability (measured as change in government) , the variability
of external shocks, central bank credibility, and the ability to
sustain a peg with reserves. The findings confirm the importance
of the economic and political factors.
It appears that high credibility and high variance of
external shocks both contribute to a choice in favor of
flexibility, as Deverajan and Rodrik argue. Political instability
also contributes to the choice of a flexible rate, suggesting
that the unwillingness to devalue may be important.
Considering a different aspect of credibility, countries
with independent central banks are found to have better records
in controlling inflation than countries with central banks under
direct government control [Cukierman, et al 1993]. But Japan and
Korea are both exceptions to these findings, since they have
managed to achieve relatively low inflation without requiring
their central banks to be formally independent.
The implications of these conclusions for Korea point in the
direction of flexibility, it seems to me. One may argue that
external shocks coming from the fluctuating yen/dollar rate will
remain important. The central bank has established a significant
degree of credibility. Governments are more likely to change in
the future than they have in the past.
Korea’s Choices
For Korea, the choice among these options has evolved
gradually (see Table 1). During the Bretton Woods era, the7
external target approach was the universally chosen option. When
floating exchange rates began, Korea continued to peg its
exchange rate to the US dollar during much of the 1970s. Since
domestic inflation was not under control, occasional devaluations
were necessary to keep the external purchasing power of the won
in line with its falling internal purchasing power. But when the
dollar began its radical appreciation during the 1980s, Korea
shifted to a managed basket peg to avoid the won being pulled up
with the dollar.
According to Oum and Cho [1995], in the 1980s Korea followed
a policy of changing the exchange rate to adjust the current
account, which is influenced by the exchange rate with a
substantial lag, as in most countries. Since the Korean current
account is heavily influenced by fluctuations in the yen/dollar
rate, this set up a lagged feedback from the cycle in the
yen/dollar rate to the won which caused the current account to
fluctuate widely.
As the yen appreciated in the late 1980s after the Plaza
Agreement, Korea’s surplus grew, leading to appreciation of the
won. By 1988 the yen peaked and began to depreciate, while the
won kept appreciating as the surplus continued, despite the
worsening of the underlying competitive position. Domestic
investment increased moderately at first, but then took off in an
unsustainable boom in 1990-91, as the current account shifted
into deficit.8
In response to the exaggerated fluctuations of the won, the
government in 1990 adopted a new exchange rate policy called the
I!MarketAverage Rate sySteln” . It seems to have achieved
stabilization of the real exchange rate, or maintenance of
equilibrium between the external and internal values of the won.
During the early 1980s, Korea along with several other
dynamic Asian economies took advantage of the sharp reduction of
inflation in industrialized countries to bring its own inflation
rate under control. As a result, since that time Korea has had
the option to use the internal target approach to control the
purchasing power of its currency. The liberalization of financial
markets that took place in the 1980s has changed the environment
in which monetary policy is made in Korea. Despite an
inflationary boom period in 1990-91 and continued strong growth
of the economy, the Bank of Korea has managed to hold the
inflation rate in the neighborhood of 5-6 percent per year.
In conjunction with the liberalized financial system, Korea
moved in the direction of a market-based exchange rate policy in
1990, currently allowing market factors to move the won-dollar
exchange rate by up to 2.25 percent per day. At the same time,
banks and other participants in the market have been allowed to
hold foreign currency balances to enable them to create an
interbank market for foreign exchange.9
B. Choice of External Relationship
In a multiple currency world, “the” foreign exchange rate
must be defined relative to each trading partner whose currency
is used in external transactions. For Korea, the primary trading
partners are North America, Japan, Europe, and Other Asia. The
major currencies involved would thus be the US dollar, Japanese
yen, and the deutsche mark (as a proxy for other European
currencies) . Since these exchange rates have fluctuated sharply
in recent years, Korea has been forced to accept significant
fluctuations in traded goods prices.
The main issue can be illustrated by the following
hypothetical example. Assume that Korea exports only to the
United States in dollars and imports only from Japan in yen. If
e~ is the won/yen exchange rate and e$ is the won/dollar exchange
rate, then export prices are p$ e$ and import prices are PI ex. The
terms of trade will then be p$ e$ /pl eY = p$ /pX eY,$ , where eY,$ is
the yen/dollar exchange rate. If dollar prices and yen prices
remain relatively stable, the terms of trade will fluctuate with
the yen/dollar exchange rate, no matter what happens to ex or e$.
This is the key problem for Korea. Only if the yen/dollar rate
follows purchasing power parity will Korea be unaffected by its
fluctuations.
If Korea pegs to the dollar, her import prices will then
fluctuate with the yen/dollar rate, while export prices are
stable. If she pegs to the yen, her export prices will fluctuate
with the yen/dollar rate, while import prices are stable.10
Choosing a basket peg enables Korea to balance its competing
interests and minimize the fluctuation of traded goods prices.
Define the basket as e~ =e$”$eI”Yeti”ti. Then pegging to the basket
sets @k = a$ ~$ + ax @x + cc~ ~~ = O, where as , ay, and ati are the
weights applied to the dollar, the yen, and the deutsche mark (or
ecu) exchange rates.
The weights are normally chosen to minimize the impact of
the resulting fluctuations on the foreign currency value of the
balance of trade. Assume that the export and import shares of the
dollar, yen, and dm are wi and vi for i = $, Y, dm. Using the
traditional model for exports and imports would put ai = [c(qf-
1)/(6+qf)] wi + vi ~, where ~ and qf are the domestic and foreign
elasticities of demand for imports and c is the domestic
elasticity of supply of exports (assuming ~f is infinite for a
small country). If qf = 2.5, q = .7, and l = 2 for Korea [Kwack,
1986], this would give weights approximately equal to the trade
shares of the dollar, yen, and mark, or (using 1994 trade shares)
39 percent for the dollar, 36 percent for the yen, 25 percent for
the mark.
On the other hand, with $30 billion worth of foreign
exchange reserves, Korea no longer has to worry about the
availability of foreign currency. Weights that would minimize the
impact on the domestic currency value of the balance of trade
would limit effects on domestic output and employment. In this
case, the weights should be ai= [(l+~)~f/(~+~f)]Wi + (1-~) vi,
which would imply weights of 43 percent for the dollar, 3211
percent for the yen, and 25 percent for the dm. The larger role
for the dollar under the domestic currency criterion reflects the
greater importance of dollar markets for




What this analysis omits is the impact of competing
suppliers in the export market, which for Korea would be Japan
and the other Asian industrializing countries, mainly Taiwan and
Hong Kong. Including competitors would increase the weight on the
yen and add Taiwan and Hong Kong to the basket. For the past ten
years, Hong Kong and Taiwan have both pegged their currencies
very closely to the US dollar. So the result would be to add to
the weights of both the yen and the dollar in the basket, with
perhaps little effect on the overall proportions. [See
Williamson, 1995].
Even if Korea chooses not to peg its currency, the basket
represents the appropriate basis for comparison of the movements
of the external and domestic purchasing power of the won. Chart 1
shows the OECD’S measures of nominal effective exchange rates of
the won and related currencies. An inverse correlation will be
noticed for most of the currencies relative to the movements of
the Japanese yen. This reflects the degree to which their dollar
pegs, especially during the 1980s, moved their currencies
relative to the yen.
Chart 2 shows the corresponding real effective exchange
rates, including my calculations for the bilateral Chinese yuan/dollar rate. During the 1980s most of
moved inversely to the yen in real as
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the East Asian currencies
well as nominal terms. In
the 90s, however, the Hong Kong and Singapore dollars have
appreciated more in real terms than the Taiwan dollar, the won,
or the yuan. which except for the latter have been relatively
stable in real terms.
Chart 3 indicates the behavior of the won, in real and
nominal terms, along with prices, as measured relative to
consumer prices in industrial countries. From the perspective of
stability in the real exchange rate, the “Market Average Rate
Systemt’appears to be performing rather well. Put differently,
the external value of the won is conforming more closely to its
internal value.
C. Financial Liberalization
In July 1993 the Government of Korea announced a seven-year
plan for liberalization of the financial sector of the economy
[Park, 1993]. The major factors include gradual deregulation of
all interest rates except deposit rates by 1997, eliminating
government influence over bank lending operations, encouraging
the development of competition and new financial instruments, and
liberalization of the foreign exchange market and of capital
flows. The purpose of this program is to use the financial
markets to improve the efficiency with which financial resources
are channeled to investment. In conjunction with this reform, the
“real name” system was implemented in 1993, requiring allaccounts to bear the real name of the
are having important repercussions on
13
holder. These major reforms
the Korean economy and
society. The tight network of personal relationships which has
characterized the partnership between business and government is
being replaced with more impersonal market-based relationships
and explicit regulations.
The impact of financial liberalization on the foreign
exchange market is significant. Kenen [1993] argues that the
primary external effect of a credible liberalization of domestic
financial markets in a developing country will be substantial
capital inflow, leading to appreciation of the real exchange
rate. He treats the existence of capital controls as equivalent
to a tax on exporting capital. Liberalization eliminates the tax
now and in the future. Thus capital inflow comes in response to
the removal of the threat of future taxation of domestic
financial assets. If the exchange rate is pegged, such capital
inflows Will reqUire sterilization of large reserve inflows. If
the exchange rate is floating, substantial nominal appreciation
will occur.
But appreciation in response to capital inflow is only one
possibility. Suppose that the capital controls limit both
foreigners who wish to import capital and Koreans who wish to
invest abroad. Their removal then leads to substantial portfolio
diversification by both foreigners and
sharp increase in both capital inflows
impact on the exchange rate. According
domestic residents and a
and outflows, with little
to Korean balance of14
payments data, both capital inflows and capital outflows have
increased sharply since the liberalization of the financial
sector in 1993. In the Korean context, the adoption of the “real
name” system could itself lead to capital outflow. If formerly
confidential transactions are now exposed to the authorities, in
future such transactions would have to be carried out offshore to
remain unknown to the authorities.
In actuality, the real (and nominal) exchange rate of the
Korean won has appreciated since the beginning of the 1993-97
liberalization of financial markets. The reasons for this
behavior are probably found more in the capital account than the
current account. During the period 1987-89, the influence of the
current account on exchange rate policy was so strong that
Korea’s exchange rate appreciated strongly at the same time that
reserves grew sharply and external debt was repaid. Then the
external windfall temporarily disappeared with the rise in
petroleum prices, interest rates, and the yen value of the dollar
during the Gulf War crisis in 1989-90. Strong real wage growth
during an inflationary boom provided internal stimulus. Korea’s
current account turned quickly negative, and the exchange rate
depreciated in real terms during the period 1991-93. Thus the
capital inflows, far from being a problem for monetary
management, were welcome financing for the current account
deficit [Folkerts-Landau, et al, 1995].
Associated with the program of financial liberalization is a
substantial liberalization of the foreign exchange market itself,15
permitting banks, firms, and individuals to hold foreign
currencies more freely and to make transactions more freely [Kim,
1994]. Also, the permitted daily fluctuation of the won has been
gradually increased, moving in the direction of a freely floating
system. This does not mean, however, that intervention will be
avoided, as foreign exchange reserves have increased by $14.5
billion since July 1993, in response to strong net capital
inflows.
D. Limiting the Rate of Capital Inflow
A range of policies may be considered in the effort to keep
capital inflows from overwhelming domestic exchange rate and
monetary policies (IMF, 1995) . Keeping the exchange rate flexible
will impose some costs on risk-averse investors and thereby limit
capital mobility. Taxing the interest earnings of foreign
investors will also limit the inflow of capital. Equivalently,
the authorities may impose reserve requirements on foreign
capital inflows. Intervention in the foreign exchange market will
limit the impact of capital inflows on the exchange rate, which
if unsterilized will lead to an increase in the domestic money
supply . Some amount of sterilized intervention can also be used,
at the cost of the interest paid on the bonds issued to soak up
the increase in liquidity. Finally, the authorities could simply
set limits on the allowed amount of capital inflows of various
types. This last tactic, like the taxes and reserve requirements,
may be subject to evasion. More seriously, it will create rents
and may lead to rent-seeking behavior, bribery, and so on. In16
summary, the best policy to limit capital inflows will be some
judicious combination of all of the above, together with allowing
some non-predictable amount of exchange rate appreciation.
III. Should Korea Join a Currency Area?
One solution to some of the problems of exchange rate policy
is the formation of a currency bloc. By pegging to a single
currency standard, whether that of a large country or of a group
of like-minded countries (as in the case of the European Monetary
System) , a country can reduce the exchange-rate-induced
fluctuation in its traded goods prices relative to the members of
the bloc. Needless to say, this makes sense only if the partner
or partners have a stable economy and inflation rate.
For Korea, there are only two choices here, either pegging
to a basket including her major markets such as Japan, the United
States, and Europe or pegging together with a group of
competitors such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and
Malaysia. The first possibility would essentially require Korea
to choose between stability of traded goods prices and the
ability to respond to external shocks, as discussed above. While
this option could minimize the variability of traded goods
prices, it would not eliminate the terms of trade fluctuations
noted earlier.
The second possibility would require a group of diverse
competitors at different levels of development to agree on
exchange rate policy and therefore on monetary policy over an
extended period of time. It is already clear that these countries17
face significantly different economic policy problems and have
chosen different exchange rate policies in the past. The Hong
Kong dollar has been pegged to the US dollar since 1984, while
both Taiwan and Singapore have steadily appreciated, Singapore
much faster. In addition, Korea’s financial liberalization is
proceeding on its own schedule, independently of the other Asian
industrializing countries.
The feasibility of a currency area also depends on the
degree of symmetry of the shocks expected to hit the various
member countries. Contemplating the potential members is not
reassuring on this score. South Korea will someday have to adjust
to reunification with North Korea. Hong Kong is facing
reintegration with China and its own entirely different set of
structural adjustments. Taiwan continues to face the threat of
attempts to reintegrate it into China. Thailand and Malaysia are
at different stages in the development process from Korea.
Reviewing these issues indicates the advantages of an independent
exchange rate policy for Korea, for the foreseeable future.
This does not, however, rule out the usefulness of increased
monetary cooperation in East Asia. With growing capital mobility
and the potential for external financial shocks spilling over
into Asian markets, coordinated strategies for responding to
external shocks could be attractive. Coordinated responses to
wide fluctuations in the yen/dollar rate could help avoid the
extent of fluctuations in real exchange rates that took place in
the late 1980s.18
IV. Implications of Korean Unification
When and if Korea reunites, it will face major structural
readjustment problems. The example of German unification suggests
that such a large real shock may be more easily adjusted to with
a flexible rate. While the full implications of reunification are
beyond the scope of this paper, it is at least clear that there
would be a large demand for new investment to enlarge the capital
stock of North Korea, both public and private. Such a large
demand shock might also be accompanied by a negative supply
shock , if Korea were to follow Germany’s example and raise wages
in the North without any corresponding increase in productivity.
The net excess demand shock would require a contractionary fiscal
response. If this were not provided, as it was not in Germany,
then tight monetary policy would be needed to prevent inflation.
The real interest rate would rise, and the real exchange rate
would appreciate at once, then depreciate gradually over time in
keeping with uncovered interest rate parity. The size of the net
excess demand shock and the implied exchange rate effect could be
reduced by more appropriate fiscal policy and wage policy.
V. Long Run Equilibria
In an economy like Korea, where per capita incomes and real
wages are rising strongly over time, one major factor affecting
the equilibrium real exchange rate is the rising relative price
of nontraded goods, as domestic labor becomes more expensive.19
Thus the real exchange rate would be expected to appreciate over
time as traded goods become relatively cheaper.
The other major factor is the increased attractiveness of
Korean real and financial assets, both to foreigners and to
Koreans themselves, as rates of return continue to be high and
the economy becomes increasingly integrated with the rest of the
world. This will also tend to appreciate the real value of the
currency, offset to some degree as Korean firms and individuals
diversify their asset holdings abroad. Particularly evident here
is the drive of Korean chaebol to establish overseas operations
as part of the process of globalization.
However, structural weaknesses can limit the rate of real
appreciation, because of the negative effect it has on the Korean
current account. Currently, Korea has been losing market share in
the United States to Asian developing countries, offsetting this
with sales gains in rapidly growing Asian markets. Among several
problems with this process are the increasing tendency of Korean
firms to move production to other Asian markets and the continued
reliance of Korean firms on imports of Japanese machinery for
expansion. Unless Korea can overcome these weaknesses, her
ability to resume a healthy path of gradual real appreciation
will be in question.Table 1. Korean Exchange Rate Regimes
Period Regime I
Characteristics
1955-1972 Bretton Woods Era Inflation/Devaluations
1973-1979 Pegged to US dollar Inflation/Devaluations
1980-1989 Managed Basket Peg Current Balance Target
1990-present I
“Market Rate System” I
Stable Real Exchange Rate21
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